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1. Constructing the debate 
The Trident programme is “unacceptably expensive, economically wasteful 
and militarily unsound” 
Gordon Brown MP, 19841 
 
In December 2006 the Labour Government presented its decision to replace the current Trident 
nuclear weapon system when it reaches the end of its service life in a White Paper on “The Future 
of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent”, effectively opting to retain nuclear weapons well into 
the 2050s.2 In March 2007 Parliament voted in favour of this decision. The system, which is 
Britain’s only nuclear weapon system, comprises nuclear warheads carried by Trident II (D5) 
ballistic missiles aboard Vanguard-class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines. The warheads 
and submarines are British built but with substantial design assistance from America. The Trident 
missiles are American designed and built. The UK has purchased 58 missiles for its four Vanguard 
submarines from a common fleet maintained in America. 
 
A decision was said to be needed in 2007 because the submarines 
carrying the missiles are aging and need to be replaced if Britain was to 
continue to deploy the Trident missile over the long-term. The 
Government’s timeline has been disputed.3 The issue sparked a fresh 
debate in Britain on the utility of nuclear weapons, the relevance of 
nuclear deterrence to British security, and the future of nuclear arms 
control and disarmament initiatives. The Government sought to 
address these issues in its December 2006 White Paper and subsequent 
statements that set out the case for retaining nuclear weapons and 
building a new fleet of submarines. 
 
The decision to replace Trident has been informed by a number of political issues that form a 
complex picture rather than one overriding central issue. Key parts of the picture include: 
 
• Conceptions of future strategic nuclear threats. 
• The continuing relevance of the logic of nuclear deterrence and its application. 
• Britain’s military-political relationship with America. 
• British nuclear weapons and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
• Nuclear weapons and the political identity of the Labour Party. 
• The cost of replacing the Trident system. 
• The French nuclear arsenal and conceptions of European security requirements. 
• Industrial pressures and incentives to replace Trident. 
• Nuclear weapons and Britain’s perception of its role in international politics. 
 
This last part of the picture covers the crucial issues of nuclear weapons and their role in 
underpinning Britain’s ‘liberal interventionist’ military doctrine and nuclear weapons and historical 
perceptions of Britain’s international status and prestige. 
 
The Government has constructed a particular case to justify replacing the current Vanguard 
submarines and effectively retain nuclear weapons into the 2050s. This case privileges certain 
understandings and assumptions about the role of British nuclear weapons and dismisses others. It 
                                                     
1 Official Report (Hansard), June 19, 1984, column 188.  
2 Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear 
Deterrent, Command 6994, The Stationary Office: London, December 2006.  
3 See in particular evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee inquiry on The Future of UK’s Strategic Nuclear 
Deterrent: The White Paper submitted by Richard Garwin, Ted Postol, Philip Coyle and Frank von Hippel that argued that 
the service life of the submarines could be extended to from 25-30 to 40-45 years. The Future of the UK’s Strategic Nuclear 
Deterrent: The White Paper, The Stationary Office, London, February 2007, p. Ev 92. 
The decision taken by 
Parliament in March 2007 
was the first significant 
step on the path towards 
replacing Trident, but it 
was not the final word 
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presents a number of important assertions and assumptions as facts and focuses on a few parts of 
the complex picture to the exclusion of others.  
 
It focuses in particular on potential future strategic nuclear threats and the ‘logic’ of nuclear 
deterrence whilst saying little about the US-UK nuclear relationship, Labour Party politics, 
industrial pressures and ideas of international status. These issues are highly relevant but politically 
sensitive and difficult to incorporate into the ‘rational’ cost-benefit analysis of nuclear threats, 
nuclear deterrence, and nuclear delivery platforms presented publicly by the Government. 
 
An independent, critical analysis of these issues and questions is therefore required. The 
rationales presented by the Government need to be unpicked and the legitimacy of its 
assertions and understandings critically examined. The issues excluded by the Government 
need to be brought into the mainstream debate and the wider implications of the decision 
require a full and balanced analysis.  
 
Without such a critical analysis it will be difficult to hold the Government’s decisions, actions and 
statements to account. The Bradford Disarmament Research Centre at the Department of Peace 
Studies, University of Bradford, is currently undertaking such an analysis. 
 
In addition to an independent and critical analysis, there are a number of important questions that 
must be asked of the Government following the parliamentary debate and vote on Trident 
replacement in March 2007. These questions respond in part to that debate and Government 
statements and in part to fundamental issues that the Government has not adequately explained or 
has dismissed as irrelevant. This briefing paper identifies five such questions: 
 
1. What specific new actions does the Government plan to undertake to meet the UK’s 
disarmament responsibilities under the NPT? 
2. Why has the Government not explored non-nuclear or ‘nearly nuclear’ strategic defence options 
and what might these look like?? 
3. Why does Britain, specifically, need nuclear weapons and how can their indefinite retention 
be reconciled with the NPT? 
4. What use will British nuclear weapons be in addressing future strategic security threats? 
5. Are nuclear weapons essential to Britain’s identity as a major power and a ‘force for good’ in 
the world? 
This briefing paper is the first in a series that will examine these issues. It argues that replacing 
Trident and modernising Britain’s nuclear weapons capability will be a lengthy process contingent 
on a range of fiscal, technological, domestic and international political issues. It sets out the nature 
of the decision made by Parliament in March 2007, future decisions that need to be made by the 
Government and debated by Parliament, and examines these five unanswered questions. 
 
The briefing argues that the decision taken by Parliament in March 2007 was the first significant 
step on the path towards replacing Trident, but it was not the final word. The deal has not been 
done on Trident and Parliament will have a major opportunity to revisit the decision when the 
Government plans to let the contracts for building new submarines in around five years – the so-
called ‘main gate’ decision.4 The period until that decision represents a critical opportunity to 
examine in detail the rationales presented by the Government and its supporters for retaining 
nuclear weapons, the issues excluded by the Government that are central to the debate, and 
alternative steps the Government can take to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons and work 
towards nuclear disarmament that build on steps it has already taken. 
                                                     
4 The 2007 edition of MOD’s UK Defence Statistics describes six phases for its ‘smart procurement’ process: concept (phase 
1); assessment (phase 2 following ‘initial gate’ project initiation approval); demonstration (phase 3 following ‘main gate’ 
major project approval); manufacture (phase 4); in-service (phase 5); and disposal (phase 6). Collectively these six phases 
are known as the CADMID cycle. UK Defence Statistics, Ministry of Defence, London, chapter 1, table 1.17. 
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2. The nature of the decision taken by Parliament  
The Government’s motion put before Parliament in March 2007 had two key components: 
 
1. To take a decision in principle on whether to replace Trident and therefore begin a process to 
design, build and commission replacement submarines to carry the Trident missiles. This was 
presented as a decision in principle to authorise ‘concept and assessment’ research and design 
work for a replacement submarine in order to keep open the option of replacing the 
submarines until a ‘main gate’ procurement decision is needed in 2012-2014.  
2. To take further steps towards meeting the UK’s disarmament responsibilities under Article VI 
of the NPT. An important incentive offered by the Government was a commitment to a 20 per 
cent reduction in warheads if the motion was carried. 
 
A decision in principle to replace Trident would not only authorise initiation of the research and 
design phase for a fleet of replacement submarines but also participation in the US Navy’s Trident 
II (D5) life extension (D5LE) programme to extend the service life of the Trident missile fleet to 
2040. This was not part of the Government’s motion but was set out in its December 2006 White 
Paper and formalised in an exchange of letters between London and Washington two days after the 
release of the White Paper. The D5LE programme was initiated by America in 2002. The US Navy 
awarded a procurement contract to Lockheed Martin in April 2007.5 Production will begin in 2008 
with initial deployment in 2011. The UK had to make a decision on whether to participate by 
2007.6The Government clearly decided this was not a decision that required Parliamentary consent.  
 
During the debate in Parliament preceding the vote the Government made three important 
assurances: 
 
1. That there will be renewed efforts to secure measures pursuant to nuclear disarmament under 
Article VI of the NPT, in particular to bring about negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off 
Treaty (FMCT) to end production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons. 
2. That the replacement system will not involve any upgrading or expansion of current nuclear 
capability. 
3. That the decision in principle to replace Trident by authorising research and design on a new 
fleet of submarines will not bind a future government or parliament to that decision and that 
there will opportunities in the future for Parliament to revisit the decision, particularly around 
the ‘main gate’ procurement decision. 
 
In presenting the motion to Parliament Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett stated that “Some 
Members have sought assurances on whether this is only a provisional decision, dependent on 
further decisions down the line. Today’s decision does not mean that we are committing ourselves 
irreversibly to maintaining a nuclear deterrent for the next 50 years…That would be absurd, 
unnecessary and, indeed, incompatible with the nuclear proliferation treaty”.7 
 
During Prime Minister’s Questions on the day of the Trident vote Tony Blair stated that “we need 
to take the decision today if we want to get parliamentary approval for the work that has to begin 
now on the concept and design phase – of course, the actual contracts for the design and 
construction are to be left for a later time. If we want to get proper parliamentary authorisation, this 
decision has to be taken now”…“we have to take the decision now if we want parliamentary 
approval for the concept and design phase”.8 
                                                     
5 “Lockheed Martin Receives $135-million Contract Modification from the Navy for Trident II D5 Missile Life 
Extension”, Lockheed Martin, Press Release, April 9, 2007. 
6 Op cit., The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, p. 11.  
7 Official Report (Hansard), March 14, 2007 column 309. 
8 Ibid., columns 278 and 280. 
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The Prime Minister went on to state that “It is absolutely right that this Parliament cannot bind the 
decisions of a future Parliament and it is always open to us to come back and look at these issues. 
He is right to suggest that when we get to the gateway stage – between 2012 and 2014 – when we 
let the main contracts for design and construction, it will always be open to Parliament to take a 
decision. However, I believe that the reason why we have to take the decision today is that if we do 
not start the process now, we will not be in the position in 2012 or 2014 to continue with the 
nuclear deterrent should we wish to do so. The real dilemma is that we decided rightly or wrongly – 
but I think rightly – that we should seek parliamentary approval even for the design and concept 
stage”.9 
 
Secretary of State for Defence Des Browne went on to quote the Prime 
Minister’s statement above and add “This happened when the previous 
generation of submarines was built [parliamentary approval being sought at 
the main gate stage], and it would be surprising if it did not happen 
again…the fundamental point is that we need to take a decision now to start 
the process”. 10  This formulation was repeated to foreign government 
representatives by Ambassador John Duncan at the 2007 NPT Preparatory 
Committee meeting. “I should make clear what we have decided”, he stated, “The UK has decided 
to begin concept and design work required to make possible a replacement for our current ballistic 
missile submarine fleets; and to maintain the option of using the D5 missile beyond its current life 
expectancy”.11 
 
The Government’s formal position was that it was seeking parliamentary authorisation to 
initiate research and design work on a new generation of ballistic missile submarines so 
that a decision can be made by the government and parliament of the day at the time of the 
main gate decision on whether or not to replace the current Vanguard submarine fleet. 
 
At the same time statements by government ministers contradicted this formal position by arguing 
that the vote in March 2007 was the vote on Trident replacement. Des Browne, for example, stated 
that “we are asking the House not just to keep our options open but to take the big decision – the 
decision in principle”.12 This reflected the view of the Conservative Opposition, which argued that 
the Government was misleading Parliament by implying that the decision could be revisited around 
the time of the main gate decision. They argued that a decision in principle, as the Government put 
it, to all intents and purposes would mean an agreement to retain nuclear weapons into the 2050s 
barring “fundamental and utterly unexpected change in world affairs”.13 The Government’s motion 
represented the decision to retain nuclear weapons for another generation. The Liberal Democrat 
view was that “the appropriate moment for the House to take the decision in principle should be at 
the main gate decision”.14 
 
Parliament should hold the Government to its formal position. The parliamentary vote in 
March 2007 should not be interpreted as the decision on replacing Trident with no further 
substantive debate until a ‘successor to the successor’ in another 25 years. 
                                                     
9 Ibid., column 284. 
10 Ibid., column 397. 
11 Ambassador John Duncan, “Statement by Ambassador John Duncan, Head of the UK Delegation to the First 
Preparatory Committee for the Eight Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”, Vienna, April 30, 
2007. 
12 Official Report (Hansard), March 14, 2007, column 397. 
13 Ibid., column 311. 
14 Ibid., column 323. 
Although a decision 
was taken in principle 
to replace Trident, that 
decision is not binding 
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3. Future decisions for parliamentary debate and 
authorisation 
The Labour Government has now set a precedent in seeking parliamentary authorisation for 
successive stages in procuring the key components of a nuclear weapons system to replace the 
current Trident system over the next 20-30 years, including decisions on replacement submarines, 
warheads and ballistic missiles. It has also set a precedent in the degree of openness about its 
deliberations on the future of British nuclear weapons set out in the 2006 White Paper, evidence to 
the House of Commons Defence Committee’s hearings on Trident replacement in 2006 and 2007 
and statements by senior members of the Government. This stands in marked contrast to the 
relative secrecy surrounding previous nuclear weapon decisions and is a welcome development. 
This level of transparency should be commended but most importantly expanded. 
 
The decision set out by the Government in the 2006 White Paper and endorsed by 
Parliament in March 2007 is the first of a series of decisions needed to replace the 
composite Trident system. Although a decision was taken in principle to replace Trident, 
that decision is not binding. 
 
The Government’s formal position strongly suggests that the deal on Trident replacement 
is not done and that Parliament will have a major opportunity to reassess UK nuclear 
weapons policy and requirements around the 2012-2014 main gate decision. 
 
The decision to proceed with the concept and design phase for a new fleet of submarines has 
resulted in the allocation of R&D funding for 2008-2011 in the Government’s October 2007 
Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR). The CSR settlement gave MOD an extra £7.7 billion over 
three years representing a 1.5 per cent average annual real terms increase.15 Part of this increase is to 
pay for work on Trident replacement.16 
 
MOD’s Defence Equipment and Support (DES) department has also established a Future 
Submarines Integrated Project Team (FSM-IPT). The IPT office was formally opened in October 2007 
and will work for the next two years to develop a concept design for a new ballistic missile 
submarine. It is led by an MOD official with deputy leadership provided by BAE Systems, whose 
shipyard at Barrow will build any new submarines. Key people with responsibility for the process 
are Rear Admiral Andrew Mathews (Director General Submarines, DES), General Sir Kevin 
O’Donaghue (Chief of Defence Materiel) and Baroness Ann Taylor (Minister of State for Defence 
Equipment and Support). Other key personnel in MOD are Tom McKane (Director General 
Strategic Requirements) and Nick Bennet (Director General Strategic Technology).17 
 
Having taken the decision to initiate concept and assessment R&D work a long-term Trident 
replacement programme faces the following decisions: 
 
¾ Main gate: MOD “expects to place a contract for the detailed design of the submarines in 
the period 2012-2014”. This will be the main gate decision.18 A contract to actually build the 
first submarine can be expected around 2016. A key design issue to be resolved at this stage 
is the number of launch tubes the new submarines will have and therefore the number of 
missiles they can accommodate. 
                                                     
15 Lord Drayson, House of Lords debate, July 25, 2007. 
16 In the first quarter after the Trident vote in Parliament MOD spent £900,000 on the Trident replacement programme. 
Official Report (Hansard), July 19 2007, column 476W.  
17 “Future Submarines Integrated Team Office Officially Opens”, BAE Systems, News Release, October 12, 2007.  
18 The Future of the UK’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Manufacturing and Skills Base: Government Response to the Committee’s Fourth 
Report of Session 2006-07, The Stationary Office, London, p. 10. 
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¾ Three or four submarines: A decision on whether to procure a fourth submarine will be 
needed around 2020-22. There will be a debate on whether three or four are needed to fulfil 
the requirements of current British nuclear posture.19 
¾ The warhead: Decisions on whether to refurbish or replace the current warhead are likely to 
be needed in the next parliament.20 Any decision to modify the warhead’s current capability 
or participate in the America’s proposed Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) programme 
could be controversial. The first US RRW design has already been signed off by the US 
Government’s Nuclear Weapons Council.21 This RRW-1 is to replace a significant portion of 
the W-76 warheads that equip much of the US Trident II (D5) fleet. The UK’s Trident 
warhead is based on the W-76 design.22 MOD is currently looking at replacement warhead 
options “to ensure we have a firm basis on which to make our decisions”, and it has been 
reported that the UK is working on a “High Surety Warhead” programme similar to the 
RRW.23 
¾ A new missile: Decisions will be needed on a successor to the current Trident II (D5) 
missile in the early- to mid-2030s. The US Navy plans to commission a new ballistic missile 
submarine into service in 2029 together with a new submarine-launched ballistic missile. 
R&D on the new missile will likely begin in the mid-2010s. The Government has sought 
assurances from the US that the missile it builds to replace Trident will be compatible with 
the new submarines the UK plans to build, but this is not guaranteed. 
¾ Tritium supply: A decision will be required on whether a new supply of tritium gas is 
needed for the current and next generation of Trident nuclear warheads.24 Most nuclear 
weapons use tritium gas to ‘boost’ their yield. Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen 
and it needs to be periodically replenished since it decays with a half-life of 12.5 years. 
¾ Submarine nuclear reactors: Decisions will be required on whether a new facility is needed 
to manufacture reactor cores for the nuclear reactors that will power the new submarines and 
whether a new reactor design is necessary.25 The reactors and reactor fuel cores are designed 
and manufactured by Rolls Royce at their Raynesway plant in Derbyshire. 
¾ An HEU manufacturing facility: A decision will be required on a new facility to 
manufacture highly enriched uranium (HEU) components for Trident nuclear warheads. 
When asked in June 2006 what plans there were for the construction of a new facility defence 
secretary Des Browne replied that “the capability to manufacture highly enriched uranium is 
required in order to maintain the existing Trident warheads throughout its intended in-
service life and to provide material for naval propulsion”.26 
¾ A new dry dock: A decision may be needed on whether to build a new dry dock at the Clyde 
submarine base to service new ballistic missile submarines. This would be subject to Scottish 
planning regulations.27 
 
                                                     
19 The youngest Vanguard submarine, HMS Vengeance, is likely to be retired in 2028 if its service life is extended by five 
years as currently planned. 
20 “Memorandum submitted by the Ministry of Defence”, House of Commons Defence Committee hearing on The Future 
of UK’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: The Strategic Context, March 14, 2006. Appendix B: The Expected Life the Trident System. 
21 Jonathan Medalia, “The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program: Background and Current Developments”, CRS Report 
for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C., June 2007. 
22 Hans Kristensen states that the British Trident warhead is similar enough to the US W-76 to form an integral part of 
the US Department of Energy’s “W76 Needs” schedule, according to a document declassified and released under the US 
Freedom of Information Act. Hans Kristensen, “Britain’s Next Nuclear Era”, Strategic Security Blog, Federation of 
American Scientists, December 6, 2006.  
23 Des Browne, oral evidence taken before the House of Commons Defence Committee hearing on The Future of the UK’s 
Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: The White Paper, February 6, 2007. Ian Bruce, “Britain in top-secret work on new atomic 
warhead”, The Herald, September 4, 2007. 
24 See Official Report (Hansard,) December 19, 2006, column 1902W.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Official Report (Hansard), June 26, 2006, column 159W.  
27 Rob Edwards, “Environment fears could block Trident expansion”, Sunday Herald, October 14, 2007. 
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4. Crucial questions that remain unanswered 
Following the 2006 White Paper, Government statements and the parliamentary debate and vote 
on Trident replacement in March 2007 a number of important questions can be identified that the 
Government has not answered, not explained or has dismissed as irrelevant to the debate. This 
briefing paper identifies five such questions that require Government attention rather than 
dismissal. 
 
1. What specific new actions does the Government plan to undertake to meet 
the UK’s disarmament responsibilities under the NPT? 
The motion put to the House in March 2007 had two parts: a decision to begin concept and 
assessment R&D for a new fleet of submarines for the Trident missile and a commitment to take 
further steps towards nuclear disarmament under the NPT. This is a continuation of the Labour 
Government’s dual-track approach of maintaining a ‘minimum deterrent’ whilst working towards 
multilateral nuclear arms control agreements that was first set out in its 1998 Strategic Defence 
Review.28 
 
The concept and assessment R&D phase for the new submarines will 
be subject to rigorous planning, resourcing and implementation. But 
the Government has said little about the scope and objectives of the 
second part of the motion on further steps towards  nuclear 
disarmament under the NPT, other than then-Foreign Secretary 
Margaret Beckett’s speech to the Carnegie International 
Nonproliferation Conference in June 2007.29 
 
The UK has made significant progress towards meeting its NPT 
obligations for which it should be applauded. The Government has 
also stepped up its important work on the technical verification of nuclear disarmament and 
warhead dismantlement at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) Aldermaston initiated in the 
late 1990s and more recently in collaboration with the Norwegian Government.30 
 
It now needs to set out how it intends to fulfil the second part of the motion with new initiatives, 
particularly in the run up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference and looking over the longer-term to 
the 2015 Review Conference. 
 
Question: Will the Government commit new financial and human resources to examining and implementing new 
technical and diplomatic initiatives, given that millions have been committed to Trident replacement studies for the 
next three years? 
 
Question: Is the Government planning to formulate fresh proposals based on the government-funded study of steps 
towards nuclear disarmament currently being conducted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies?31 
 
Question: Margaret Beckett stated before the Commons that “the next step that we hope to take is to bring 
forward negotiations on the fissile material cut-off treaty”.32 Negotiations on such a treaty have been stalled for years. 
                                                     
28 Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review, Command 3999, 1998, The Stationary Office, London, chapter four. 
29 Margaret Beckett, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons?”, Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, 
Keynote Address, June 25, 2007. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Dr. Kim Howells, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stated that “we are supporting an 
independent International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in-depth study to help determine the requirements for the 
eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. In particular, we are working with IISS on holding a workshop to focus on 
some of the crucial technical questions in this area”. Official Report (Hansard), July 18, 2007, column 409W. 
32 Official Report (Hansard), March 14, 2007, column 301. 
The Government has said 
little about the scope and 
objectives of the second 
part of the motion on 
further steps towards 
nuclear disarmament 
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What new initiatives does the Government propose to undertake to work towards the opening of negotiations? 
 
Question: What does the Government aim to achieve through the Norwegian 7 Country Initiative to foster fresh 
thinking on meeting NPT non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear technology commitments?33   
 
Continued rhetorical support for existing nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements and 
proposals is commendable and important, but fresh proposals sponsored by the UK would have a 
significant impact on wider efforts to galvanise movement towards nuclear arms control and 
disarmament.  
 
 
2. Why has the Government not explored non-nuclear or ‘nearly nuclear’ 
strategic defence options and what might these look like? 
A number of studies have examined options and steps the nuclear weapon states can take to make 
progress towards disarmament – many of which the UK has already done.34 The UK has: 
 
• Ended nuclear testing and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). 
• Ended production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons. 
• Published accounts of its holdings and history of fissile material production to increase 
transparency of the UK nuclear weapons programme. 
• Withdrawn all tactical nuclear weapons from service. 
• Reduced the number of Trident nuclear warheads to the lowest level so far. 
• Reduced the operational status of Trident so that the single Trident submarine on patrol is at 
several days notice to fire.35 
• Undertaken a major body of research on the technical verification of nuclear disarmament. 
. 
Now is not the time to stop. The UK should continue on this trajectory of ‘minimum deterrence’ 
and technical studies on steps towards nuclear disarmament by commissioning detailed analysis on: 
• Steps that could be taken to further reduce its nuclear missile and warhead arsenal. 
• How training and simulation operations and procedures could reduce reliance on a 
continuous-at-sea deterrence (CASD) posture that requires four submarines and at least one 
on patrol at any time and reduce the current tempo of operations. 
• How such steps would affect understandings of the credibility of the UK’s nuclear deterrent 
threat. 
• The steps involved in further de-alerting the nuclear arsenal by de-mating some or all 
warheads from their missiles and storing them at a separate location or locations. 
• How the UK could move to a non-deployed ‘responsive’ nuclear force and how a ‘minimum’ 
nuclear force might be redeployed if a major strategic nuclear threat emerged over months 
and years. 
• How the de-mating of warheads and/or non-deployment of the nuclear force could be 
verified under a future arms control agreement. 
• The role that non-nuclear strategic global strike weapons technology could play in deterrence 
missions. 
• The role that a limited cruise/ballistic missile defence system could play in ‘point defence’ to 
protect a responsive non-deployed nuclear force from missile attack. 
• What a formal nuclear no-first use agreement would entail and how it could be negotiated. 
                                                     
33 The seven countries are Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania, South Africa and the UK. See “Norwegian 
Initiative to Strengthen International Co-Operation on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation”, February 13, 2006 
at http://www.norway.org.au/policy/organizations/norwegianinitiative.htm. 
34 See for example the recommendations of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Australian 
Government, August 1996. 
35 This is a political rather than technical process that could be overridden in a crisis. See The Future of the UK’s Strategic 
Nuclear Deterrent: The Strategic Context, House of Commons Defence Committee, The Stationary Office: London, p. 12. 
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• How the use of HEU in the naval nuclear fuel cycle could be effectively verified under a 
future FMCT, relating in Britain's case to its nuclear powered submarine fleet. 
 
Currently it is clear that the UK has not examined non-nuclear or ‘virtual’ nuclear solutions to the 
general threat of future nuclear blackmail. The Government’s current nuclear strategy is ‘business as 
usual’ for the next 40 years. It will retain four (perhaps three) submarines with one submarine on 
patrol with a complement of 48 warheads. It remains wedded to a continuous-at-sea deterrence 
posture to provide a permanently survivable nuclear force, despite that fact that the prospect of a 
disarming surprise nuclear strike on the UK is so low as to be zero. 
 
The reduction to 160 warheads announced by the Government is a 
welcome but small reduction given that the UK is judged to have been 
operating at around 180 warheads.36 A reduction of 20-30 warheads 
over the lifetime of Trident’s successor does not constitute progress 
towards nuclear disarmament. 
 
In June 2007 Margaret Beckett articulated a vision of the UK as a 
‘disarmament laboratory’.37 The Government should takes steps to realise that vision by seriously 
investigating these options and the challenges surrounding them with respect to its own nuclear 
arsenal. It should consider exploring alternative conceptions of ‘minimum deterrence’ to enable it 
to move beyond the present status quo. It could easily do this whilst keeping options open to 
procure any new submarines in 2012-2014.  
 
This would build on the Government’s record and make a significant contribution to progress 
towards nuclear disarmament. It would demonstrate how steps towards significantly reducing the 
salience of nuclear weapons could be undertaken and identify challenges for further examination. 
 
 
3. Why does Britain, specifically, need nuclear weapons and how can their 
indefinite retention be reconciled with the NPT? 
This is a crucial question that has not been adequately addressed by the Government. The decision 
to replace Trident and the rationales presented to support it reveal a commitment by the 
Government to what it considers an inescapable and fundamental logic: nuclear weapons are an 
essential capability in an increasingly uncertain world. Declarations of retaining only a ‘minimum 
deterrent’, of not targeting nuclear weapons at any particular state and of only using them in 
extreme situations of national survival are overshadowed by this logic. 
 
This makes it very difficult for the Government to fully support efforts to reduce the spread of 
nuclear weapons and support a universal norm against nuclear proliferation and nuclear use whilst 
insisting that it needs these weapons for its own security for the foreseeable future, particularly 
when Britain faces no strategic nuclear threats. 
 
This is a real and troubling contradiction that leads inexorably to an uncomfortable question: what 
prevents any other state appropriating the Government’s ‘strategic’ logic that stresses how 
important nuclear weapons are to British security, particularly if these states face more serious 
strategic threats than the UK?  
 
The answer is very little. Any other country can adopt this logic which Britain and the other nuclear 
weapon states continue to legitimise and re-legitimise through their nuclear weapons policies and 
actions. States can adopt this logic and remain outside the confines of the NPT or, if they have 
signed the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, they can leave the treaty by citing “extraordinary 
                                                     
36 Hans Kristensen, “Britain’s Next Nuclear Era”, Federation of American Scientists, Strategic Security Blog, December 7, 
2006. Available at http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2006/12/britains_next_nuclear_era_1.php.  
37 Op cit., Beckett, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons?”.  
The Government’s 
current nuclear strategy 
is ‘business as usual’ 
for the next 40 years 
DRAFT – NOT FOR CITING                   Trident: The Deal Isn’t Done 
 
Bradford Disarmament Research Centre :  Department of Peace Studies : University of Bradford                 11 
events” that have jeopardised their “supreme interests” and giving three months notice. 
 
The Government does not refute this contradiction but attempts to escape it by insisting that 
Britain is legally entitled to possess nuclear weapons indefinitely under the terms of the NPT – an 
interpretation that is strongly at odds with the understandings of most of the 185 non-nuclear 
weapon state signatories of the treaty. 38  This is supported by a powerful sense of ‘nuclear 
exceptionalism’ – the idea that the UK is major power, that it has an important and stabilising role 
to play and international affairs, that major powers are nuclear powers, and therefore the UK must 
retain its nuclear capability indefinitely.39 
 
The NPT established a crucial international norm of not developing and deploying nuclear 
weapons and of working towards nuclear disarmament as an equitable solution to the problem of 
nuclear weapons and the threat they pose.40 This norm can only be undermined by Britain’s decision to 
replace Trident, the conflation of ‘major power’ and ‘nuclear power’ and the enduring sense of 
nuclear exceptionalism, despite the Government’s legal argument and statements to the contrary. 
As then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated in 2006, “All of the NPT nuclear-weapon States 
are modernizing their nuclear arsenals or their delivery systems.  They should not imagine that this 
will be accepted as compatible with the NPT.  Everyone will see it for what it is: a euphemism for 
nuclear re-armament.”41 
 
Question: How can the Government accept the logic of ‘realpolitik’ that demands retention of nuclear weapons in 
an uncertain world but deny that logic to other states and insist they accept an alternative logic of cooperative security 
enshrined in the NPT? 
 
Question: How sustainable is this approach over the long term? Is it not realistic to expect other states to seek an 
alternative form of nuclear equity through nuclear proliferation if the nuclear weapon states, including the UK, 
continue to articulate a very clear need for nuclear weapons? 
 
 
4. What use will British nuclear threats be in addressing complex strategic 
security threats of the future? 
The Government argues that the primary benefit from its nuclear weapons is protection against 
nuclear blackmail and coercion by a major nuclear power, a nuclear-armed ‘rogue’ state, or their 
terrorist allies. 
 
There are serious problems with this argument. First, there are few, if any, realistic scenarios in 
which the UK would explicitly threaten and be prepared to use its nuclear weapons against a major 
nuclear power, specifically Russia or China. The Government acknowledges that it faces no such 
                                                     
38 Tony Blair said in February 2007 that the NPT “makes it absolutely clear that Britain has the right to possess nuclear 
weapons” (Official Report (Hansard), 21 February 2007, column 260), that “it is clear that those who are the major 
nuclear powers can remain nuclear powers, fully consistent with the non-proliferation treaty…it is recognised, and it is at 
the heart of the non-proliferation treaty, that Britain, along with those other countries [the other four recognised nuclear 
weapons states], should be able to be a nuclear power” (Hansard, 4 December 2006, column 34); that “at the heart of the 
non-proliferation treaty is the recognition that there will be major nuclear power states, of which Britain is one” (Official 
Report (Hansard), 4 December 2006, column 36). In September 2004 Denis MacShane, then Minster for Europe, stated 
that “Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), five states—the United Kingdom, the United States, France, 
Russia and China—are legally entitled to possess nuclear weapons” (Official Report (Hansard), 1, September 2004, 
column 689W). This position is derived solely from the UK being recognised as a nuclear weapon State under the NPT. 
Margaret Beckett stated in her speech in Parliament in March 2007 that “The NPT created two distinct categories of 
states. Those that had already conducted nuclear tests – ourselves, the US, the Soviet Union, China and France – were 
designated nuclear weapons states and could legally possess nuclear weapons. All other states-signatory were designated 
non-nuclear weapons states” (Official Report (Hansard), March 14, 2007, column 300). 
39 John Gittings, “After Trident: Proliferation or Peace?”, International Relations, vol. 21 no. 4 (December 2007), p. 390. 
40 George Perkovich, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security – 2007 Report Card on Progress, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 2007, Washington, D.C., p. 22.  
41 Kofi Annan, lecture at Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, November 28, 2006. 
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strategic nuclear threats today and hasn’t for at least ten years (the 1998 Strategic Defence Review 
said the same).42 Nuclear weapons may have performed an important deterrent function in the Cold 
War to deter and contain an expansionist and ideologically adversarial Soviet Union, but those 
conditions no longer apply and have not done for many years. There is little prospect of a resurgent 
nuclear-armed Russia threatening to build a new empire at the expense of British, European or 
international security. 
 
Second, the Government has not explained how nuclear deterrence will function against ‘rogue’ 
states and their potential terrorist allies. The principles of nuclear deterrence may remain the same, 
as the Government argues, but the international strategic context in which it is applied has changed 
dramatically. It is not realistic, credible or proportionate to threaten to destroy a ‘rogue’ state 
through use of a handful or more 100 kiloton Trident nuclear 
warheads in retaliation for a ‘rogue’ state or terrorist WMD attack. As 
former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated, this would 
in, effect, mean the deaths of thousands or tens of thousands of 
people who are in many ways the victims, or hostages, of the ‘rogue’ 
government.43 Nuclear weapons also have no conceivable role to play 
in addressing terrorist threats which remain “outside the bounds of a 
deterrent strategy”.44 In fact Tony Blair stated in October 2005 that “I 
do not think that anyone pretends that the independent nuclear 
deterrent is a defence against terrorism”.45 
 
The proposed benefit from nuclear weapons stems from an ability to deter nuclear blackmail and 
coercion and to provide an assurance that any future crises will not escalate beyond UK control 
through our own nuclear deterrent threat.46 The Government portrays this ability to deter with 
nuclear weapons and the assurance they provide as an irrefutable fact, or an ‘iron law’, and an 
assured solution to the potential problem of future nuclear blackmail from a range of belligerents. 
 
But the application of nuclear deterrence is uncertain and criteria for what will deter a particular 
adversary now and in the future are essentially arbitrary. This will become more so as strategic 
security threats and crises become more dissipated and complex. As former Senator Sam Nunn, 
former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz and former Secretary of Defense 
William Perry stated in January 2007, “Deterrence continues to be a relevant consideration for 
many states with regard to threats from other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for this 
purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective.”47 Yet in this uncertain 
world the Government has decided to bet heavily on the certainty of the logic of nuclear deterrence 
and its application. 
 
Question: How can the Government be so confident that nuclear deterrence will operate with such certainty in such 
an uncertain future environment?  
 
Question: How will British nuclear deterrent threats play a constructive role in addressing complex future crises 
and decisively alter the decision-making processes, perceptions and understandings of potential ‘rogue’ state and 
terrorist adversaries?  
                                                     
42 Op cit., The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, p. 18. 
43 Rumsfeld argued that “Let’s say that the al Qaeda had used a biological weapon… Can you imagine going in and saying 
to the President, I think it would be a terrific idea if we used a nuclear response to the fact in Afghanistan because the al 
Qaeda used a biological weapon or a chemical weapon against the United States. And you’d end up punishing people who 
in many respects were victims, they were hostages of the al Qaeda.” See Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with the National 
Journalists Roundtable, August 5, 2002, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. at 
www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t08072002_t0805sd.html and CNN Interview with Secretary Rumsfeld, June 1, 2001, 
U.S. Department of Defense, at www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t06042001_t0601cnn.html. 
44 Op cit. Nunn et al “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”. 
45 Official Report (Hansard), October 19, 2005, House of Commons, column 841. 
46 Op cit., The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, p. 5. 
47 Nunn, S, Schultz, G, Kissinger, H and Perry, W, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, Wall Street Journal, January 7, 
2007, p. A15. 
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A much stronger argument can be made that deterrence is far from the 100% guarantee portrayed 
and that possession of a nuclear arsenal only buys the UK potential protection from nuclear threats 
in a very limited number of conceivable circumstances at significant financial and political cost. As 
General George Lee Butler, former head of U.S. Strategic Command responsible America’s nuclear 
forces, eloquently stated in 1998 nuclear “deterrence is a slippery conceptual slope. It is not stable, 
nor is it static, its wiles cannot be contained…it gives easy semantic cover to nuclear weapons, 
masking the horrors of employment with siren veils of infallibility”.48 
 
The Government also argues that future instability generated by climate change, population growth, 
resource conflict, and the spread of military technology may lead to greater chance of inter-state 
conflict. The risk of such conflicts plus the potential for further nuclear proliferation means that the 
UK may face a greater chance of becoming involved (or getting itself involved) in conflicts with 
nuclear-armed states – therefore the UK must retain its nuclear arsenal.49 
 
Yet it is extremely difficult to construct viable scenarios in which a conflict entered into for 
complex issues involving access to vital resources, humanitarian issues, terrorism and WMD 
proliferation would correspond to the extreme threat to national survival needed to legally justify 
resort to an explicit threat and even use of nuclear weapons in self-defence, as stipulated by the 
ruling of the International Court of Justice in 1996.50 
 
Then there is the question of the ‘sub-strategic’ role of Trident. The Government has now 
expunged the term ‘sub-strategic’ from officialdom but the capability to deliver low-yield nuclear 
warheads still remains, together with a doctrine that still allows for the first use of nuclear weapons 
in a crisis.51 This stands in contrast to the Government’s insistence that British nuclear weapons are 
not for war-fighting. Greater transparency is needed about this capability and its envisaged purpose. 
As Michael Codner of the Royal United Services Institute argues, the Government needs to resolve 
this paradox between ‘sub-strategic’ and ‘not for war-fighting’.52 
 
Question: What is the capability of low-yield Trident warheads, what doctrine governs their employment and what 
broad roles does the Government see for them in the context of nuclear deterrence?  
 
 
5. Are nuclear weapons essential to Britain’s identity as a major power and a 
‘force for good’ in the world? 
Nuclear weapons are an important part of Britain’s identity as a major power, a self-proclaimed 
‘force for good’ in international security affairs and as the United States’ principal political-military 
ally.  
 
                                                     
48 General George Lee Butler, “The Risks of Nuclear Deterrence: From Superpowers to Rogue Leaders”, speech to the 
National Press Club, Washington, D.C., February 2, 1998. 
49 Op cit., The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, p. 18.  
50 The 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
concluded that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law 
applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law” but it could not “conclude 
definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-
defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake”. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Advisory Opinion, International Court of Justice, July, 8 1996. 
51 Defence secretary Des Browne declared in January 2007 that “we have deliberately chosen to stop using the term ‘sub-
strategic Trident’, applied previously to a possible limited use of our weapons”. “The United Kingdom’s Nuclear 
Deterrent in the 21st Century”, Speech by Secretary of State for Defence Des Browne, King’s College London, January 25, 
2007. But as the 2006 White Paper makes clear with reference to “the continued availability of a lower yield from our 
warhead”, the capability still remains. The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, p. 23.  
52 Memorandum from Michael Codner, House of Commons Defence Committee hearing on The Future of the UK’s Strategic 
Nuclear Deterrent: The Strategic Context, March 14, 2006, p. Ev 73. 
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The Labour Government and Conservative Opposition are both committed to an internationalist 
and Atlanticist foreign policy in which the UK is prepared to intervene militarily in conflicts around 
the world alongside the United States in defence of the ‘Western alliance’ and its ‘vital interests’. 53 
This rests on two enduring assumptions of the wider British political establishment: first, that the 
UK should play a major role in global affairs and that it is important for global order and stability 
that it does so;54 and second, that the UK’s primary foreign policy goal is to “remain the closest ally 
of the U.S., and as allies influence them to continue broadening their agenda”.55   
 
The British political and defence establishment views nuclear weapons as an important component 
of Britain’s armed forces that give it the confidence to engage in such ‘liberal interventionist’ 
activities even in circumstances in which the prospect of nuclear use is very distant. Nuclear 
weapons facilitate Britain’s willingness to support America militarily and are thereby seen to play a 
crucial, if indirect, role in allowing Britain to remain Washington’s primary military ally. They are 
seen as part of a package of ‘power projection’ military capabilities that make the UK a ‘major 
power’ militarily and politically together with a range of other qualities, such as economic, 
diplomatic and cultural power. The Carrier Strike Programme comprising procurement of two new 
aircraft carriers and a fleet of Joint Combat Aircraft at a cost of £12-14 billion can also be seen in 
this context.56   
 
Because of the role nuclear weapons play in supporting Britain’s international identity it is very 
difficult for policy-makers who engage in activities that produce and reproduce that identity to 
conceive of not having nuclear weapons. A commitment to replacing Trident is therefore closely 
linked to a commitment to continue with an interventionist foreign and defence policy that has 
been widely questioned following the invasion of Iraq in 2003. An indication of this conception of 
the role of British nuclear weapons was revealed in March 2006by Kim Howells, Minster of State at 
the Foreign and Commonwealth, who stated that “the UK is committed to helping to secure 
international peace and security. Since 1956, the nuclear deterrent has underpinned our ability to do 
so even in the most challenging circumstances”.57 
 
These identity relationships need to be acknowledged and challenged.  
 
Question: Are nuclear weapons essential for a ‘force for good’ interventionist doctrine?  Australian support and 
military commitment to the US-led ‘war on terror’ has demonstrated that a nuclear capability is not necessary to 
participate fully alongside America in interventionist activity if a government so chooses.  
 
Question: Are nuclear weapons a vital component of ‘major power’ identity?  Japan’s power on the world stage 
does not require nuclear weapons, despite the serious potential nuclear threats from North Korea and China. Tokyo 
has responded in other ways. 
 
Question: Are nuclear weapons required for Britain’s identity and capabilities as a ‘defender of Europe’? A more 
progressive vision would seek a nuclear-weapon free zone in Europe similar to that adopted in Africa, South 
America, Central Asia and South-East Asia. 
 
Question: Are nuclear weapons a crucial military capability for a major military power, or do they undermine it? 
The costs of the conventional military trappings of ‘major powerhood’ are expensive and arguably emasculated by a 
costly nuclear capability. 
                                                     
53 Tim Dunne, “‘When the Shooting Starts’: Atlanticism in British Security Strategy”, International Affairs, vol. 80, no. 5 
(2004), pp. 893-909. 
54 See Tony Blair’s speech on HMS Albion, “Our Nation’s Future – Defense”, January 12, 2007 and Lawrence Freedman, 
Defence, in Seldon, A. (ed), The Blair Effect: The Blair Government 1997-2001, Little Brown and Company: London, p. 295. 
55 Tony Blair, “Britain’s Place in the World”, Prime Minister’s speech at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
Leadership Conference, January 7, 2003, at www.pmo.gov.uk/output/Page1765.asp. Lawrence Freedman, “The Special 
Relationship, Then and Now”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 3 (May/June 2006), p. 61. 
56 Paul Rogers, ‘Big Boats and Bigger Skimmers: Determining Britain’s Role in the Long War’, International Affairs, Vol. 
82, No. 4 (July 2006), p. 651. 
57 Official Report (Hansard), February 28, 2007, column 1384W. 
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5. Conclusion: If replacing Trident is the answer, what is the 
question? 
The decision made by the Government to move forward with Trident replacement and the vote in 
Parliament in March 2007 do not constitute the final word but the first step in a long process. 
Further major decisions are required, not least of which is the crucial main gate decision in 2012-
2014. 
 
Future decisions will be subject to a number of dynamics. With a major capital spending 
programme through the 2010s the Navy’s budget and wider MOD spending could be squeezed to 
the extent that procuring four new ballistic missile submarines begins to look unattractive, 
particularly if the UK faces an economic downturn over the next decade. Procuring Trident’s 
successor will cost £15-20 billion. This will come at a time when MOD is procuring the new 
Astute-class attack submarine (£3.5bn for the first three of a possible seven), six Daring-class Type-
45 destroyers (£3.6bn), the two new aircraft carriers and Joint Combat Aircraft (£12-14bn), the 
Future Rapid Effects System range of armoured vehicles for the Army (£6bn for 3,500 vehicles), 
232 Typhoon fighter aircraft (£21bn), and 14 new Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (£13bn). This 
comes at a time when three former Chiefs of the Defence Staff are arguing that the Government is 
underfunding the armed services and short changing troops in the field.58 
 
Progress on nuclear proliferation and steps towards nuclear 
disarmament at the 2010 and 2015 NPT Review Conference could 
erode the rationales presented by the Government for replacing 
Trident. Parliamentary resistance in Westminster on grounds of cost, 
relevance or international political impact could constrain and 
undermine the Trident replacement process. 
 
Scottish civil, parliamentary and Executive opposition could prove politically insurmountable. On 
May 3, 2007 the Scottish National Party gained a majority in the Scottish Parliament. The SNP and 
the majority of Scottish MPs are committed to a nuclear weapon-free Scotland. On June 14, 2007 
the Scottish Parliament voted overwhelmingly against the British Government’s decision to replace 
Trident by a vote of 71 to 16 with 39 abstentions. Opinion polls show a majority of Scots opposed 
to Trident.59 
 
The Government, however, is convinced that Trident is a strategic military and political asset and 
has shaped the debate to reflect that conviction. It cannot conceive of not having nuclear weapons, 
primarily because it now has them. But if Britain did not now have nuclear weapons it is very 
unlikely that it would seek to acquire them60 – suggesting that the strategic need identified by the 
government is less urgent and essential than claimed. 
 
As far as the Government is concerned, replacing Trident is the answer, but it is not at all clear 
what the question is. The Government has tried to argue that future strategic nuclear threats are the 
question. But the rationales presented to support this argument can be unpicked to reveal a shaky 
foundation. 
 
A more powerful argument can be made that challenges the relevance of Trident replacement to 
the strategic deterrent tasks asked of it and exposes the potential liability it poses in terms of the 
impact on the non-proliferation and disarmament norms at the heart of the NPT. 
 
                                                     
58 Michael Evans, “Retired Military Chiefs Join Forces to Battle for a Bigger War Chest”, The Times, November 9, 2007. 
59 Rob Edwards, “Salmond: Help us get rid of Trident”, Sunday Herald, October 21, 2007. 
60 See comments by former Director of Nuclear Policy at MOD, Commodore Tim Hare, “What Next for Trident?”, 
RUSI Journal, April 2005, p. 30.  
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Compelling arguments can also be made that replacing Trident is the answer to a different question, 
or set of questions, to do with maintaining a close defence relationship with America, maintaining 
the ability or confidence to engage in ‘liberal interventionist’ activities as a self-proclaimed ‘force for 
good’, a strong desire on behalf of the Labour Party not to revisit in any way the unilateralist 
debates of the 1980s, a strong historical association between an ‘independent’ British nuclear 
arsenal and status as a major power, and a powerful gut-feeling not to leave France as the only 
nuclear weapon power in Europe.61  
 
Nowhere are these issues addressed in the Government’s White Paper and they have only been 
superficially examined in the wider debate. But, as George Lee Butler argues, it is essential that “the 
root causes, the mindsets and the belief systems” that underpin the commitment to a nuclear 
defence policy and nuclear exceptionalism are brought to light and better understood.62 
 
Finally this government has repeatedly committed itself to a process of multilateral nuclear 
disarmament and the norms established by the NPT. It regularly articulates a self-identity as a ‘force 
for good’ in international security affairs. It is therefore incumbent upon the Government to fully 
support and resource detailed examination of the issues highlighted under question two in 
collaboration with external expertise and with nuclear- and non-nuclear weapon states where 
appropriate and feasible.  
 
It is equally crucial that Parliament be given the information and opportunity to scrutinise, question 
and challenge Government decisions on the long-term Trident replacement programme through its 
committees and parliamentary debate. 
 
                                                     
61 Sir Michael Quinlan, former Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, stated in 2006 that “to leave the 
French as the only people with this [nuclear capability] I think would twitch an awful lot of fundamental historical nerves”. 
Oral evidence taken before the House of Commons Defence Committee inquiry into “The Future of the UK’s Strategic 
Nuclear Deterrent: The Strategic Context”, March 14, 2006. 
62 Op cit., Butler “The risks of Nuclear Deterrence”. 
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